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 1 Introduction
Suppose you have a ﬁnite support of incomes and 14 equally spaced incomes
which cover this whole support. If you ask subjects to assign these 14 in-
comes to seven categories ranging from “very bad” to “excellent”, you will
expect them to assign precisely two neighboring incomes in increasing order
to the respective categories. Yet, this picture changes dramatically when
these equally spaced income stimuli are embedded in sets of adventitious
or background income stimuli which serve to create diﬀerent income distri-
butions. The background context causes subjects to rate the same income
stimulus higher if there are only few higher incomes in the respective income
distribution and lower if there are many incomes ahead of the considered
income in the respective income distribution. Thus, income categorization
and, a fortiori, income satisfaction, depend on the background context.
When subjects are asked to categorize incomes, they seem to step into
the shoes of the income recipients and categorize the respective incomes with
respect to relative deprivation. Although context dependence of categoriza-
tion was widely investigated in psychology, it has, to the best of our knowl-
edge, never been systematically studied with respect to the satisfaction with
and the categorization of incomes. This is perhaps due to the prevalence of
positively–skewed income distributions in virtually all societies. However, it
is tempting to examine the eﬀects of relative deprivation of other shapes of
income distributions and compare the results. For a given aggregate income
in an economy this implies that diﬀerent patterns of income distributions en-
gender diﬀerent welfare eﬀects. The present paper canvasses context eﬀects
of ﬁve diﬀerent shapes of income distributions.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 informs succinctly on re-
search on context dependence, Section 3 presents a short survey on range–
1frequency theory, Section 4 describes the experiment, Section 5 discusses its
results, and Section 6 concludes. The instructions and the stimulus material
of the experiment have been relegated to the Appendix.
2 Context Dependence: A Succinct Appraisal
Parducci (1968, p. 84) observed that acts of wrongdoing are rated more
leniently in a context of rather nasty behavior than in a context of mild mis-
behavior. Experimental research by Birnbaum (1973, 1974b), too, evidenced
that subjects tend to judge persons by their worst bad deed.
Birnbaum et al. (1971) presented subjects lines of diﬀerent length. They
found that the eﬀects of any particular line upon the judgment of average
length varied inversely with the length of the other lines within the same set.
Birnbaum (1974a) investigated subjects’ perceptions of the magnitude of
numerals. He observed that the categorization of 45 to 47 numerals ranging
from 108 to 992 depended decisively on the shape of their distributional
arrangement. Birnbaum (1992) found that certainty equivalents of binary
lotteries are rated higher when associated with negatively–skewed than with
positively–skewed distributions of proposals.
Parducci (1982) observed that subjects’ categorization of squares of dif-
ferent size depended decisively on the skewness of the distribution according
to which the diﬀerently sized squares were presented. In a similar experi-
ment, Mellers and Birnbaum (1982) found that the members of identical sets
of squares were assigned to higher categories of darkness (expressed as the
number of dots contained in a square) when their presentation was embed-
ded in a positively–skewed dot distribution of other squares than when it was
embedded in a negatively–skewed dot distribution.
2Notice that these ﬁndings, although related to, go beyond mere anchoring
eﬀects1 and simple context eﬀects2. They establish a relationship between the
shape of the distribution of the presented stimuli and subjects’ judgments
on a categorial scale. Strong contextual eﬀects exist for category ratings.
Parducci (1982) has characterized such eﬀects as a constituent of human
behavior:
I would have little interest in subjects’ expressions of value experiences
if these did not change with context. A particular income that might
have seemed magniﬁcent at an early stage in one’s career would seem
totally inadequate at a later stage. If a response scale did not reﬂect
this change, it would miss the all important decline in experienced
value. (p. 90)
Closer inspection shows that categorization of stimuli depends not only
on the shape of the distribution of the stimuli but also on their range. It
diﬀers also for closed sets of categories and open–ended categories.
While Luce and Galanter (1963, p. 268) had deplored the lack of a so-
phisticated theory of category judgments which deﬁnes a scale of sensation
that is invariant under experimental manipulations, Parducci and associates,
upon having noticed that subjects’ evaluation and categorization of objects
depended on their background context, set to work to develop such a theory,
to wit, range–frequency theory. It was developed from Parducci’s (1965) li-
1Anchoring has been studied by Hunt and Volkmann (1937), Rogers (1941), McGarvey
(1942/43), Helson (1947). For more recent work compare, for example, Tversky 1974,
p. 154; Tversky and Kahneman 1974, p. 1128; Quattrone et al. 1984; Northcraft and
Neale 1987; Green et al. 1995; Jacowitz and Kahneman 1995.
2See, for example, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000) for sentences for crimes which increase
if the victim is considered as “more valuable” or if the oﬀender is considered as “less
valuable”.
3men model and has proved to reveal important insights into category rating
(Parducci 1968, 1974, 1982; Parducci et al. 1960; Parducci and Perret 1971;
Birnbaum 1973, 1974a, 1974b, 1992; Birnbaum et al. 1971; Mellers 1982,
1986; Mellers and Birnbaum 1982). This theory takes into account that the
distribution of stimuli in which they are embedded matters for the evaluation
and categorization of the very same objects.
3 Range-Frequency Theory: A Short Survey
Range–frequency theory captures the dependence of category assignments on
the distribution and the range of stimuli. It comprises equations for the range
value, the frequency value, for judgment, and for the category assignment
(Parducci 1982, pp. 94–5).
The range value Ri of stimulus Si depends on the value of this stimulus





The frequency value Fi of stimulus Si depends on the rank of this stimulus,





The judgment of stimulus i, Ji, is modelled as a weighted mean of the range
value and the frequency value:
Ji := wRi + (1 ¡ w)Fi; 0 · w · 1: (3)
The category assignment of stimulus i, Ci, is then the simple transformation:
Ci := bJi + a; (4)
4where b denotes the range of possible categories and a the rank assigned to
the lowest category, in most cases: 1. Thus, category assignment assumes
that categories are equally spaced; adjoining categories diﬀer precisely by 1.
For w = 0 only the frequency value matters, that is, the same number of
stimuli is assigned to each category in increasing order. For instance, if there
were seven categories, then the seventh one of lowest–ranked stimuli would
be assigned to the lowest category, and so on.
For w = 1 only the range value matters, that is, the range of the stimuli
is equally split. Stimuli are assigned to categories according to the limens of
the equally–wide intervals of the range of the stimuli. This means that, if
Si is placed in another context with the same minimum value but a higher
maximum value of the stimuli, then Si tends to fall back in judgment and
categorization. On the other hand, if the minimum of the stimuli decreases
while their maximum remains unchanged, Si tends to advance in judgment
and categorization.
Range–frequency theory considers categorization to be a weighted aver-
age of these two components. Thus, it posits that categorization is linear
both in stimulus value (range component) and in stimulus rank (frequency
component). Arranging stimuli on the abscissa and categories on the ordi-
nate should produce a nonlinear graph if w < 1 and if the distribution of
stimuli is not uniform. Nonlinearity of this graph is caused solely by the
assumption of linearity of categorization in stimulus rank (frequency compo-
nent). Psychologists sometimes estimated w = 0:45 (Parducci et al. 1960,
p. 74) or w = 0:475 (Birnbaum 1974a, p. 92), sometimes they just adopted
w = 0:5 (for example, Parducci and Perrett 1971, p. 429).
Tests of range–frequency theory use sundry distributions of stimuli, for
example, uniform, symmetrical unimodal, symmetrical bimodal, positively–
5skewed and negatively–skewed distributions. The respective distributions
are generated either by appropriate spacing and/or appropriate frequency of
stimuli (see, for example, Parducci 1965, 1974; Parducci and Perrett 1971),
or by embedding a set of (usually equally spaced) stimuli into a superset
of adventitious stimuli (see, for example, Mellers 1982, 1986; Mellers and
Birnbaum 1982; Parducci 1982) which shape the intended distribution.
For all distributions of stimuli the judgment function becomes steeper
where the stimuli are more densely packed. Thus, if the subsets of equally
spaced stimuli (which are common to all distributions) are arranged on the
abscissa and the mean categorial value on the ordinate, symmetric uni-
modal distributions produce an S–shaped curve, bimodal distributions pro-
duce an ogival–shaped curve, positively–skewed distributions produce a con-
cave curve, and negatively–skewed distributions a convex curve, where the
curve of positively–skewed distributions lies above the curve of negatively–
skewed distributions. The distance between curves is greater the less cate-
gories are admitted. Moreover, subjects tend to exhaust the available cat-
egories. If the set of stimuli is truncated, all categories are nevertheless
occupied, although relatively more tenuously.
Range–frequency theory has been successfully employed by Mellers (1982,
1986) for the investigation of equity judgments such as equitable salaries or
equitable taxation as functions of merit. Mellers winnowed out the “Aris-
totelian” subjects, that is, those, whose responses conformed with propor-
tionality. For the rest, she placed merit ratings on the abscissa and mean
salaries on the ordinate, and received precisely the pattern described in the
preceding paragraph (Mellers 1982, pp. 259–261; 1986, pp. 82–86).
In an attempt to rescue his linear equity model (Harris 1976, 1980), Har-
ris (1993) transformed Mellers’ merit stimuli to yearly salaries, used these as
6stimuli, and observed a linear relationship between his stimuli and the equi-
table salaries. However, when using Mellers’ merit design proper as stimuli,
he found Mellers’ results conﬁrmed. Thus, he concluded that stimulus dimen-
sion, too, matters for subjects’ behavioral conformity with range–frequency
theory. Note, however, that Harris’ treatment contains an element of equi-
table redistribution of a given salary structure, which is diﬀerent from a
primordial assignment of salaries according to merit.
4 The Experiment
4.1 Aims and Scope
This paper pursues four aims. Firstly, we examine whether background con-
text matters. In other words, we canvass how the categorization of the same
set of stimuli systematically depends on the background context. Indeed, cat-
egorization of incomes using diﬀerent distributions of stimuli has never been
studied thoroughly. Mellers and Harris examined the judgment of equitable
salaries, not income categorization based on diﬀerent income distributions.
Secondly, we investigate relative deprivation by way of income categoriza-
tion.3 When subjects categorize incomes, they cannot wholly avoid stepping
into the shoes of the income recipients whose incomes they are asked to judge.
Thus, they feel relative deprivation of an income position if many incomes
3Relative deprivation was introduced by Stouﬀer et al. (1949), and further elaborated
by Runciman (1966). Similar ideas were developed by philosopher Temkin (1986, 1993).
Temkin suggests that inequality aversion results from the complaints of income recipients
in the low income echelons akin to relative deprivation. In an experimental investigation
of the Temkin theory, Devooght (2002) found particular support for the dependence of
complaints on the weighted sum of the gaps of incomes in excess of mean income and of
mean income.
7are encountered which are ahead of this income (likewise, they may feel “rel-
ative elation” if the particular income ﬁgures among the higher income strata
within the income distribution).
Thirdly, we investigate whether range–frequency theory is a valid de-
scription of the categorization of incomes. Moreover, we focus on the proper
weights of the range and frequency components, an issue which has been
understudied in earlier research. After deriving the weights of the range
and frequency components, we will investigate which income distribution
generates most happiness both in terms of personal income satisfaction and
aggregate well–being.
Finally, the present study investigates also the reverse side of income
categorization, to wit, the production of the limens of income categories.
In particular, we check whether the structure of the limens matches income
categorization.4 If the limens of income categories depend on the distribution
of the presented stimuli, then utility functions of income estimated from such
data cannot but reﬂect the respective pattern.5
4It seems that only Birnbaum (1974a) had paid attention to the reverse side of income
categorization. Instead of asking subjects for the limens of income categories, he asked his
subjects for their judgments of their typical numbers for each category.
5For instance, the Leyden school has ventured to estimate utility functions or individual
welfare functions of income from data of limens of income categories. Cf., e.g., van Praag
(1968, 1971), van Praag and Kapteyn (1973), van Herwaarden et al. (1977), Kapteyn
and van Herwaarden (1980), van Herwaarden and Kapteyn (1981). For a criticism of
the Leyden approach cf. Seidl (1994). The present paper oﬀers another explanation of
the lognormal hypothesis of the Leyden utility function of income, to wit, that it is a
reﬂection of income categorization stemming from everyday experience with positively–
skewed income distributions. In a seminal study, Birnbaum (1974a) reconciled range–
frequency theory with the existence of a psychophysical function which is indeed invariant
with respect to background context eﬀects. In the realm of income, this function is but
a utility function of income. In this view, the lognormal utility function emerges as a
84.2 The Experimental Design
The experiment was computerized and told subjects a cover story of the
income distribution on a planet called Utopia, inhabited by small green in-
dividuals with the UFO as the local currency (see the Appendix). This
extraterrestrial story was employed to distort as much as possible any conno-
tation with the extant positively–skewed income distributions and, thereby,
provide an unbiased test of context dependence of categorization. For this
purpose, we chose a support of 100 and 1,000 UFOs for all income distri-
butions and used Italian subjects who were at the time of the experiment
accustomed to a completely diﬀerent dimension of currency units.
Insert Table 1 about here.
For our experiment, we used ﬁve distributions, which were truncated to
secure the above ﬁnite support: uniform, normal, bimodal (mixture of two
normal distributions), positively–skewed (lognormal), and negatively–skewed
(negative lognormal). To generate the experimental design, we used the
parameters stated in the second and third columns of Table 1. In a ﬁrst step,
we computed the respective truncated distribution functions, divided their
range (the unit interval) by 43 and computed the projection of these equally
spaced values on the support (the 100–1,000 interval), which produced the
mathematical bases of our stimuli.
In order to be able to compare a subset of identical stimuli across the ﬁve
manifestation of a unique utility function of income which owes its particular shape to the
positively–skewed appearance of empirical income distributions.
9experimental designs, we formed a sequence of 14 equally spaced values,6
which were embedded in 28 adventitious income values which provided the
background context of the respective experimental distributions. To accom-
plish that, we replaced the nearest values in the mathematical bases of the
distributions by the values of the equally spaced subsets of stimuli, which
formed our experimental design. The right side of Table 1 provides mean,
standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the experimental stimulus dis-
tributions. To check whether our manipulation to create the experimental
stimulus distributions changed the character of the mathematical distribu-
tions, we applied a Wilcoxon signed–ranks test, which did not reject the null
hypothesis of identity.7
4.3 Procedure
As a warm–up introduction, subjects were ﬁrst shown 25 values taken from
the mathematical distributions. Then the 42 values of the experimental
design were presented to the subjects in a random order, ﬁrst as a synopsis,
and then one at a time. Subjects were asked to assign them to one of the
categories excellent, good, suﬃcient, barely suﬃcient, insuﬃcient, bad, very
bad. After that, all stimuli were again shown together with the subject’s
categorization. Subjects were asked to conﬁrm or change their categorization
assignment. Thereafter, subjects were asked to provide limens of the seven
income categories.
The experiment was administered from April 24, 2001, to May 5, 2001, at
6We started at 135 UFOs, and formed the sequence using a distance of 64 (in two cases
63) UFOs.
7We do neither report the mathematical bases and the experimental values of our
stimuli nor the details of the Wilcoxon test here in order to save space. The respective
tables are available from the authors on request.
10the Laboratorio Informatico, Department of Economics, University of Bari,
Italy. 250 subjects participated in this experiment, 50 for each of the ﬁve
distributions. Subjects were only admitted to a single participation. Each
subject received a lump–sum reimbursement of 15,000 Italian Lire (about 7.5
EURO. Subjects spent between 6 and 43 minutes to complete the experiment
(mean: 16.1 minutes, standard deviation: 6.2).
5 Results
Comparing subjects’ primary and revised category assignments we found
them to be not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. This allowed us to use only the revised
assignments of categories for our analyses.
5.1 Background Context Matters
Table 2 contains the mean (¹) and median (M) assignments of the 14 com-
mon stimuli to the seven categories, coded from 1 (very bad) to 7 (excellent).
The table shows that the subjects actually exhausted the categories irrespec-
tive of the distribution of stimuli because the categories coincide for the tails
(135 UFOs and 965 UFOs, respectively).
Insert Table 2 about here.
For our experiment, testing on background–context eﬀects is equivalent
to testing on whether the ﬁve sets of observations have the same underlying
distribution for a given stimulus income. That is, the null hypothesis for













ns(z) 8 z 2 R ;
where un=uniform, no=normal, bi=bimodal, ps=positively–skewed,
ns=negatively–skewed. Since neither normality nor cardinality of the ob-
servations hold, we use the (non–parametric) Kruskal–Wallis (KW) test in
order to test on background–context eﬀects. The results (Â2 values and sig-
niﬁcance levels p) of this test for each of the 14 common stimuli are given in
the last two columns of the table.
For the interior common stimuli (191–901 UFOs), we observe considerable
background context eﬀects: The respective Kruskal–Wallis tests are signiﬁ-
cant at the 1% level, except for the 454 UFOs stimulus which is signiﬁcant
at the 10% level. That is, for 12 of 14 tests performed, we have to reject
the null hypothesis that the ﬁve diﬀerent sets of observations came from
the same distribution. Assuming stochastic independence of the 14 observa-
tions (per subject) under the null hypothesis,8 a supplementary binomial test
would strongly reject the null hypothesis that this results from pure chance
(p = :006).
This subsection demonstrates that background context matters for in-
come categorization. Our test was global in the sense that it did not allow
pairwise comparisons. In the next subsection, we are concerned with a di-
rectional hypothesis.
5.2 Relative Deprivation
The ﬁgures in Table 2 show a clear tendency: The positively–skewed distri-
bution by and large exhibits the highest mean assignments, followed by the
8This assumption is, of course, not unproblematic.
12bimodal distribution, and the uniform and the normal distributions. Un-
der the negatively–skewed distribution, subjects’ categorization of incomes
turns out worst. Take, for example, the 773 UFOs category: The diﬀer-
ence between the positively–skewed and the negatively–skewed distributions
amounts to no less than 0:84 categories.
Consequently, we hypothesize that identical income stimuli are perceived
to belong to higher evaluation categories if the background context shifts
more income mass to lower income brackets or, the other way round, if the
background context exhibits more income mass concentrated among higher
income strata, then the evaluation of identical income stimuli is downgraded
(relative deprivation). In order to test on relative deprivation, we com-
pute Spearman’s rank correlations between the subjects’ categorizations of a
stimulus and the number of incomes larger than that stimulus as a measure
of relative deprivation. Note that, if alternative measures of relative depri-
vation such as the sum of incomes exceeding the stimulus etc. are applied,
results do not change qualitatively.
Insert Table 3 about here.






k are independent ;
where Xk and Y k denote the distributions of the categorizations of stimulus
k and the corresponding number of incomes larger than the stimulus (see
Table 3), respectively. As can be taken from Table 3, the null hypothesis of
independence is rejected for 11 of 14 tests at the 5% signiﬁcance level and
13for 12 of 14 test at the 10% signiﬁcance level. Furthermore, all signiﬁcant
correlations exhibit the right, negative, sign. Again, a binomial test would
strongly conﬁrm that this does not result from pure chance (p = :006).
Hence, we conclude that relative deprivation is an important factor in
the evaluation of incomes: The more incomes exist which exceed the income
to be evaluated, that is, the greater the relative deprivation associated with
this income is, the worse is this income’s categorization for the respective
background.
5.3 Range–Frequency Theory
In order to test the empirical performance of range–frequency theory in the
















where the judgment of stimulus i under income distribution k is given by
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®k denotes an intercept term, wk
R and wk
F denote the weights of the range
and the frequency components, respectively, and uk
i is an error term.
Using equation (5), we can test three postulates of range–frequency the-
ory: The ﬁrst postulate requires the intercept term ®k to equal zero (neu-
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14and the third postulate demands that the weights must be nonnegative (if
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Furthermore, we can also test on whether diﬀerent distributions of income
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in addition to (5) and compute the respective F tests. Background–context
dependence is tested by means of a pooled sample and dummy variables.
Note that we did not run any regressions for the uniform distribution since
range and frequency values coincide [the numerator of the range equation (1)
becomes exactly Fi times the denominator of (1)].
Table 4 contains the estimates of the weights using OLS. For every distri-
bution of income stimuli, the table compares the restricted (above) with the
unrestricted regression (below). The model summary shows a much better
ﬁt of the unrestricted model. Hence, the F test (last column) strongly rejects
the null hypothesis of additivity, that is, the restriction wF = (1 ¡ wR) does
not hold. In all 4 cases, the sum of the estimated coeﬃcients for Ri and Fi
slightly exceeds 1.9 Hence, we focus our attention on the unrestricted model
in the following.
9This contradicts, a result obtained by Parducci et al. (1960, p. 75).
15Insert Table 4 about here.
With the exception of the positively–skewed distribution, the intercept
terms are insigniﬁcant as maintained by the neutrality hypothesis. The in-
tercept term of the positively–skewed distribution exhibits a negative sign.
This means that a positively–skewed distribution of stimuli biases subjects’
categorizations of incomes downwards. That is, although relative deprivation
is lowest and, thus, income categorizations are highest under the positively–
skewed income distribution, a (relatively small) premium is attached to the
judgment function of the positively–skewed income distribution. This result
is possibly due to an endowment eﬀect [Tversky and Griﬃn (1991, p. 117]
caused by the relatively low mean income of the positively–skewed income
distribution.
Except for the normal distribution, the estimated weights of the range
and the frequency components are inside the unit interval, that is, the non-
negativity hypothesis cannot be rejected. The weight of the range component
amounts to about 0.8, that is, distinctly more weight is given to the range
component than to the frequency component. With regard to the normal
distribution, we observe a weight of the range component larger than 1.
Computing the t value for the null hypothesis wR ¡ 1 = 0 shows, however,
that wR does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from 1. On the other hand, the frequency
component does not matter at all for the categorization of incomes.
Eventually, we ran an (unrestricted) pooled regression with the positively–
skewed distribution as the benchmark case and dummies for the diﬀerential
intercepts and slopes of the other distributions in order to test on background
context. The adjusted R2 of this regression is :935 (F = 3645, p · :01). As
compared to the positively–skewed income distribution, the intercept terms
16of the normal, the bimodal, and the negatively–skewed distributions are sig-
niﬁcantly larger (the t values are between 2.090 and 2.863; p · :05) which
conﬁrms that the neutrality hypothesis is rejected only for the positively–
skewed income distribution, whose mean income is lowest. Moreover, the
pooled regression conﬁrms that the range component is given a signiﬁcantly
greater and the frequency component a signiﬁcantly smaller weight, respec-
tively, under the normal distribution (the t values are 2.081 and ¡2:576,
respectively; p · :05). That is, the shape of the normal distribution seems
to induce subjects to categorize the stimulus incomes by range alone. The
diﬀerences between the weights of the bimodal, the positively–skewed, and
the negatively–skewed distributions are not signiﬁcant [bimodal vs. positively
skewed: t = ¡:345, p = :723 (range), t = :203, p = :839 (frequency); neg-
atively vs. positively skewed: t = ¡1:132, p = :258 (range), t = 1:181,
p = :238 (frequency)]. For these three income distributions, the structural
part of income categorization in terms of the weights entering the judgment
function is equal and independent of the shape of the income distribution to
be judged. In other words, under the bimodal, the positively–skewed, and
the negatively–skewed income distribution background context matters for
the categorization of incomes but not for the judgment function itself.
Summarizing, we ﬁnd, ﬁrst, the neutrality hypothesis of range–frequency
theory violated for the positively–skewed income distribution but not for
the other income distributions. Second, additivity is violated for all income
distributions considered. The component weights are slightly super–additive.
The estimates demonstrate that, third, the weights are within the interval
[0;1] and, fourth, not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for the negatively–skewed, the
positively–skewed, and the bimodal income distributions but, ﬁfth, far oﬀ
from values around w = 0:5 estimated (and sometimes merely assumed) by
17psychologists (for example, Parducci et al. 1960, p. 74; Parducci and Perrett
1971, p. 429; Birnbaum 1974a, p. 92). Instead, the weight of the frequency
component is much smaller, being close to :2.
Two reasons can account for the low weight of the frequency component.
Firstly, Harris’ (1993) conjecture can have something in it. Using incomes
instead of ratings could have moved subjects’ behavior closer to the linear
model. However, relying on real monetary values, Mellers (1986) observed
pronounced curvatures of the judgment functions in her work on equitalbe
taxes. Also Parducci et al. (1960) and Birnbaum (1974a) found distict cur-
vatures of the judgment functions of experiments on a size categorization of
numerals which ranged within the interval from 108 to 992 (similar to the
support of the income distributions used for our experiment).
Secondly, recall that Mellers (1982, 1986) winnowed out the subjects with
Aristotelian equity values (who endorsed proportionality for distributive jus-
tice). This comes up to the elimination of all subjects who behaved in con-
formity with the range component only. This had somewhat increased the
inﬂuence of the frequency component.
5.4 Income Satisfaction versus Well–Being: A Para-
dox
Whereas psychologists construct the graphs of the judgment functions or
the category assignment functions for the common stimuli only, using the
mean category assignments as exhibited in Table 2, we construct the graphs
of the judgment functions for all 42 stimulus values using the estimates of
the unrestricted weights of the range and the frequency components. The
respective graphs are shown in Figure 1.
18Insert Figure 1 about here.
This ﬁgure conﬁrms the message conveyed by the entries in Table 2: The
graph of the judgment function of the positively–skewed income distribution
exhibits a concave shape and dominates all other judgment functions up to
incomes of about 800 UFOs. The graph of the judgment function of the
negatively–skewed income distribution exhibits a convex shape and is dom-
inated by all other judgment functions over the whole interval of stimulus
incomes. For the judgment functions of the normal and the bimodal income
distributions we observe linear and S–shaped graphs, respectively. The latter
two intersect several times, and lie for most incomes between the graphs of
the judgments functions of the positively–skewed and the negatively–skewed
income distributions. For incomes above about 800 UFOs the graph of the
judgment function of the bimodal income distributions dominates all other in-
come distributions. Thus, a positively–skewed income distributions generates
the highest income satisfaction for small and moderate incomes. Concerning
the top incomes, the highest income satisfaction is conveyed by a bimodal in-
come distribution. Under a negatively–skewed income distribution, personal
income satisfaction turns out to be lowest. These observations are perfectly
in line with our previous result that a positively–skewed income distribution
generates less relative deprivation than a negatively–skewed one.
Notice that income satisfaction is inverse to the means of the distribu-
tions. Mean income is highest for the negatively–skewed distribution, yet
income satisfaction is lowest. For the positively–skewed distribution, the
mean income is lowest, yet income satisfaction is highest. The mean income
of the other three distributions is not much diﬀerent among them and lies in
between, as does by and large income satisfaction. Does this imply that the
19positively–skewed income distributions, which prevail in the real world, are
able to elicit the highest income satisfaction from a given aggregate income?
Our experiment even suggests that the negatively–skewed distribution elicits
the minimum individual income satisfaction from the maximum total income.
However, greater individual income satisfaction does not necessarily im-
ply a higher level of well–being or social welfare within the respective society.
Rather do we have to aggregate the individual welfare of the income recip-
ients. Applying a Harsanyi-type social welfare function, we sum individual
income satisfaction from below and divide the partial sums by the number







Accordingly, the graph of ¯ W shows average social welfare for all income
recipients disposing of an income of yi or less. Figure 2 graphically depicts
the average well–being of the society under diﬀerent income distributions.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
Figure 2 shows that average well–being is highest under a bimodal income
distribution for those income recipients who do not dispose of more than
about 400 UFOs. If we consider also better incomes between 400 and 800
UFOs, then the Utopians are best oﬀ with a normal income distribution.
Eventually, if we take into account the top earners as well, the negatively–
skewed income distribution generates greatest average well–being.
Comparing the graphs of the judgment functions and average well–being
of the positively–skewed and the negatively–skewed income distributions, we
20strike a paradoxical situation: Under a positively–skewed income distribu-
tion every single income recipient, even the top earners, experiences higher
individual income satisfaction than under a negatively–skewed income distri-
bution; yet, for each stratiﬁed subset of subjects, average well–being under
a negatively–skewed income distribution exceeds average well–being under a
positively–skewed income distribution.
This is akin to an observation made by Camacho–Cuena, Seidl, and Mo-
rone (2002). When subjects had to assess income distributions as a whole
from under a veil of ignorance, they seem to pay attention to all possible in-
comes to which they may be attributed within an income distribution. This
aﬀects their ratings of income distributions: Even for income distributions
with identical means, negatively–skewed distributions are rated distinctly
higher than positively–skewed distributions, possibly because they oﬀer the
better chance to end up at a comparatively satisfactory income level.10
5.5 Pattern of Limens
After subjects had categorized the 14 stimulus incomes, they were told that,
for the purpose of future use in Utopia’s statistical oﬃce, they should state
limens for the seven income categories. Moreover, they were told that the
10For ample experimental evidence see Camacho–Cuena, Seidl, and Morone (2002), who
observed also a preference reversal phenomenon [cf. Seidl (2002)] between the rating and
the evaluation of income distributions. For the context of the present paper, categorization
of incomes is more akin to rating than to evaluation. Beckman, Formby, Smith, and Zheng
(2002) observed less opposition to Pareto-improving moves of income distributions when
subjects make their judgments under a veil of ignorance. For known positions, opposition
against extra income is highest for income gains of persons in a higher income echelon,
less for persons in a lower income echelon, and least for own extra income. This ﬁnding
matches with our results for individual income satisfaction in the present paper.
21limens should properly reﬂect the income distribution prevailing in Utopia.
Note that subjects were not forced to express consistent behavior in the sense
that the upper limen of of a category had to be equal to the lower limen of
the following category.11
We observed only one category overlap12, but several empty intervals
between category limens.13 What might have prompted subjects to behave
in this way? They are too many to explain their behavior simply by error,
even more so as these subjects made their responses without overlaps between
limens, but empty intervals between them. Therefore, it seems as if these
subjects took our question under the proviso of making entirely unambiguous
statements such as: “An income between 405 and 506 UFOs is certainly
insuﬃcient. But for incomes between 331 and 404 UFOs I am not entirely
sure whether they are still bad or already insuﬃcient. Likewise, for incomes
between 507 and 598 UFOs, I am not entirely sure whether they are still
insuﬃcient. Therefore, to be on the safe side, I make statements only for
those areas for which I am entirely conﬁdent.”14
11This is in contrast to the surveys of the Leyden school, where subjects could indicate
only one of these two ﬁgures.
12This one instance seems to be an error because this same subject exhibited empty
intervals for the other categories.
13Among our 50 subjects per distribution, we observed 12 subjects with empty inter-
vals for the uniform distribution, 10 for the symmetric distribution, 11 for the bimodal
distribution, 9 for the positively–skewed distribution, and 14 for the negatively–skewed
distribution.
14Obviously Birnbaum (1974a) had anticipated such an attitude. Wisely, he asked his
subjects only for their “typical numbers” for each category. Indeed, if in everyday life
one asks subjects for suﬃcient incomes, one often gets a representative income level as an
answer rather than an income interval.
22Insert Table 5 about here.
Table 5 lists the means (¹) and medians (M) of the lower and upper
limens of the seven income categories for the ﬁve income distributions. In
analogy to Table 2, the test on background context eﬀects with respect to
income categorization, the Kruskal–Wallis test (see the last two columns of
Table 5), shows that background context matters. For 9 of the 12 tests
conducted, the null hypothesis of the 5 sets of observations coming from the
same distributions has to be rejected (p · :10).
Comparing Table 5 with Table 2 and conﬁning ourselves to the mid-
dle limens (from “bad” to “suﬃcient”), we see that the negatively–skewed
distribution of stimuli, which exhibits the lowest category assignments and,
therefore, income satisfaction, in Table 2, exhibits the highest limens in Table
5. It is followed rather indiscriminately by the uniform and the symmetric
distributions which ranks third in Table 2, and then by the bimodal distribu-
tion, which occupies rank two in Table 2. The positively–skewed distribution
of stimuli, which exhibits the highest category assignments in Table 2, shows
the lowest limens in Table 5. Thus, the ordering of the limens corresponds by
and large with the category assignments; subjects behaved consistently for
both sides of the medal. This reﬂects again the inﬂuence of the background
context on the perception of income limens for the calibration of categories.
If the background context exhibits more income mass concentrated among
the higher income brackets, subjects become more exacting, which shifts the
limens of income categorization in the direction of higher incomes. However,
if more income mass is concentrated among the lower income brackets, sub-
jects become more humble as to income categorization, that is, categorial
limens are shifted in the direction of lower incomes. Background context
23of stimuli matters also with respect to the perception of limens of income
categorization.
This shows that limen setting reﬂects relative deprivation: Limens are
higher the more incomes are ahead of the limen incomes. On the other hand,
inspection of Tables 6 and A1 reveals that the total income level, too, matters.
A modest endowment eﬀect is, therefore, also at work. Higher income levels
are capable of compensating for enduring more better–oﬀ income recipients,
which constitutes the second inﬂuence on limen setting.
6 Conclusion
This paper uses the data gained from an income categorization experiment to
investigate background context eﬀects, relative deprivation, range–frequency
theory to explain background context eﬀects, individual income satisfaction
versus aggregate well–being, and the dual patterns of income categorization
and limen setting.
Five groups of 50 subjects were asked to assign 14 common income stim-
uli to seven income categories. These common stimuli were embedded in 28
adventitious stimuli to form ﬁve diﬀerent income distributions, uniform, nor-
mal, bimodal, positively–skewed, and negatively–skewed. Each distribution
was presented to a group of subjects.
Firstly, we found that background context matters. Using a Kruskal–
Wallis test, we had to reject the hypothesis that the ﬁve diﬀerent sets of
observations of income categorization came from the same distribution. This
means that the background of the 28 adventitious income stimuli had inﬂu-
enced income categorization.
Secondly, we investigated the direction of background context eﬀects,
24which led us to discover that relative deprivation is at work to shape the pat-
tern of background context. Spearman’s rank correlations between income
categorization and the number of incomes ahead of the respective stimuli
shows a signiﬁcantly positive relationship. Thus, identical income stimuli
are perceived to belong to higher evaluation categories if the background
context shifts more income mass to lower income brackets, or, the other way
round, if the background context exhibits more income mass concentrated
among higher income strata, then the evaluation of identical income stimuli
is downgraded.
Thirdly, background context eﬀects have been explained by means of
range–frequency theory, which posits that the categorization of a stimu-
lus is a weighted mean of this stimulus’ range and frequency component.
We found that neutrality is violated for the positively–skewed distribution,
which reﬂects the working of a modest endowment eﬀect. Furthermore, the
weights are slightly super–additive and nonnegative. The frequency compo-
nent is ruled out for the normal distribution. For the negatively–skewed,
the positively–skewed, and the bimodal income distributions, the weight of
the frequency component is about .2 and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for the
negatively–skewed, the positively–skewed, and the bimodal income distri-
butions. This result is remarkable, because for the negatively–skewed, the
positively–skewed, and the bimodal income distributions background context
matters for the categorization of incomes, but not for the judgment function
itself.
Fourthly, we struck a paradox between individual income satisfaction and
aggregate well–being. Whereas the judgment functions show that individual
income satisfaction is highest for the positively skewed income distribution
and lowest for the negatively skewed income distribution, a Harsanyi–type
25social welfare function demonstrates that average aggregate well–being is
for all stratiﬁed subsets of subjects higher for the negatively skewed income
distribution than for the positively skewed income distribution. This paradox
results from the weighting of income satisfaction with the frequency of the
involved subjects.
Finally, we found that limen setting of income categories provides a pic-
ture which is perfectly consistent with income categorization. This demon-
strates that response–mode eﬀects are absent for experiments on income
categorization on the one hand, and limen setting on the other.
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31Tables
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Experimental Distributions
Parameters for
generation
Moments of experimental distri-
butions
Distribution ¹ ¾ Mean Std.dev. Skewn. Kurt.
Uniform (550) (260) 550 258 .000 ¡1:200
Normal 550 230 549 198 .000 ¡:544
Bimodala 325, 775 100 550 241 .000 ¡1:479
Positively–skewedb 6 1 408 230 .738 ¡:349
Negatively–skewedc 6 1 692 230 ¡:735 ¡:348
Table note. All distributions truncated at 100 on the left and at 1000 on
the right.
aMixture of two normal densities.
bLognormal density.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33Table 3 Test on Relative Deprivation




Stim. un no bi ps ns rs p
135 40 41 41 39 41 .100 .116
199 37 40 40 33 40 -.183 .004
263 34 38 36 27 39 -.277 .000
327 31 35 31 22 38 -.274 .000
390 28 32 26 18 36 -.298 .000
454 25 28 23 15 34 -.171 .007
518 22 23 21 12 32 -.188 .003
582 19 18 20 9 29 -.274 .000
646 16 13 18 7 26 -.359 .000
710 13 9 15 5 23 -.262 .000
773 10 5 10 3 18 -.353 .000
837 7 3 5 2 14 -.122 .055
901 4 1 1 1 8 -.183 .004
965 1 0 0 0 2 -.044 .491
Table note. un=uniform, no=normal,
bi=bimodal, ps=positively–skewed,
ns=negatively–skewed. n = 250 for all
tests.
aSpearman’s rank correlation between the
number of incomes larger than the stimulus
and the categorization of that stimulus.
34Table 4 OLS Estimation of Weights
Coeﬃcients 95% CI wR Model summary Test on
® wR wF 95% CI wF F a R2 additivityb
Normal distribution
**.010 **.939 (.061) [:853;1:025] 460.986 .398
.003 .044 — .000
-.001 **1.034 -.012 [:895;1:173] 5814.075 .943 6664.298
.007 .071 .061 [¡:131;:108] .000 .000
Bimodal distribution
**.019 **.765 (.235) [:612;:918] 96.151 .121
.003 .078 — .000
.004 **.823 **.206 [:665;:981] 5357.242 .939 9346.656
.006 .080 .078 [:052;:359] .000 .000
Positively–skewed distribution
-.001 **.850 (.150) [:777;:923] 523.337 .428
.006 .037 — .000
**-.028 **.855 **.187 [:783;:927] 5658.250 .942 6176.862
.009 .037 .038 [:112;:262] .000 .000
Negatively–skewed distribution
*.015 **.783 (.217) [:692;:874] 284.062 .289
.008 .046 — .000
-.002 **.791 **.256 [:701;:882] 3717.255 .914 5065.407
.009 .046 .047 [:163;:348] .000 .000
Table note. n = 700. *p · :10, **p · :05; tested against 0. Above:
restricted model; below: unrestricted model. Standard errors in italics.
aFirst row: F value, second row: signiﬁcance level.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1 Graphs of Judgment Functions
37Income






























Figure 2 Average Well–Being Under Diﬀerent Income Distributions
38Appendix
Instructions and Stimulus Material
Income evaluation in Utopia15
Suppose you live in the future and participate in a space shuttle ﬂight to
the planet Utopia, which is inhabited by small green individuals. The local
currency in Utopia is the UFO.
Suppose further that each small green individual bears on his or her chest
a visible identiﬁcation card, which (among other information) also shows his
or her income. Utopia’s constitution states that the lowest allowable income
is 100 UFOs, while the upper income ceiling is 1000 UFOs: nobody must earn
less than 100 UFOs, and nobody must earn more than 1000 UFOs. Consider
that 100 UFOs is beyond the survival income level and that more income is
always preferable.
After your landing on Utopia, you walk around in Utopia’s capital, called
Haley, and observe the income of several subjects.
Then 25 values taken from the true mathematical distribution
of the respective group were shown in a random order to allow
subjects to become acquainted with the experimental procedure.
After your short trip through Haley, you meet Utopia’s Prime Minister
who had invited you to consult him with respect to an important issue: As
you are an economist (a species completely unknown in Utopia), the Prime
Minister asks you to make an evaluation of the incomes earned in Utopia. He
wants you to categorize the incomes earned in Utopia into seven categories,
viz.:








In order to perform this job properly, the Prime Minister presents to you
a booklet containing a random sample of the incomes of 42 income recipients.
You are assured that this sample is a perfect representation of the income
distribution in Utopia.
In the following you can see the 42 entries of this booklet.
Now 42 values of the respective experimental distribution were
shown in random order. First, the whole set of values was shown
on the monitor and thereafter all entries were shown one at a
time (in the very same order) and subjects were asked to assign
them to one of the above categories. After all values had been
assigned to categories, subjects were shown all values together
with their categorization and could either conﬁrm or change their
categorization. Both the prior and posterior categorizations were
recorded.
The Prime Minister is quite happy with your categorization of incomes,
which enables him to gain insights into the social stratiﬁcation of Utopia.
For future use of Utopia’s statistical oﬃce, he asks you to state also limens
for the seven income categories (notice that there is no inﬂation in Utopia).
40For this purpose, he gives you a questionnaire and asks you to ﬁll it in. Your
limens should properly reﬂect the income distribution prevailing in Utopia.
A green individual’s income is
very bad if it is less than UFOs
bad if it is between and UFOs
insuﬃcient if it is between and UFOs
barely suﬃcient if it is between and UFOs
suﬃcient if it is between and UFOs
good if it is between and UFOs
excellent if it is higher than UFOs
After this, your task is done. The Prime Minister thanks you and awards
you the Utopian Order of the Garter in return for your services to his planet.
41